Here’s The Rest of the Story
Nguyễn Thùy Linh DDS
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Tội ác lớn nhất của Cọng Sản trong lịch sử Việt Nam
Viet Cong Strategy of Terror
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 PhotoFunia Breaking News Regular 2019 04 13 12 50 36

 

PROLOGUE

                                                                                                

In modern history, right after WWII, four states had been arbitrarily created through the division of two single countries into four opposite political identities: Germany into East and West Germany; and Korea into North and South Korea. Nine years later, in 1954, after the Geneva Agreement, Vietnam was arbitrarily partitioned across the 17th Parallel, into North and South Vietnam. The existence of South Vietnam was assumed and predicted, by many political fortune tellers, to last until 1956; it then would have ended by a general election that would officialize Ho Chi Minh’s sovereignty over a united Vietnam. The three arbitrary partitions above were an integral part of the Cold War.

Forty-four years after WWII, East Germany succumbed when the Berlin Wall crashed under the tsunami of democratization that swept the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, ending the Cold War. West Germany as an American protégé won handily without a bullet being fired. More than 60 years after its creation, in 2017, when this book was being written, South Korea still stood enjoying freedom and democracy, and even prospered beyond all expectations.

South Vietnam showed a completely different story. Within 21 years (1954-1975), after successfully surviving the deadly crisis at birth, South Vietnam sprang up as a prosperous nation in Southeast Asia, diplomatically recognized by more than 50 countries worldwide. SVN went through seven years of brilliant development, from 1956 until 1963, when President Diem was assassinated. Then began an intensive phase of fighting when the war was stepped up vigorously by the Communists, then counteracted by the United States entering the war. Without President Diem on the scene, the epic Tet Offensive, a military victory for SVN, marked a dramatic downward plunge of the Communist insurgency with its infrastructure devastated. This largely enhanced the future of SVN. The Spring Offensive in 1972, initiated by Hanoi with Russian tanks and Chinese heavy guns, again failed while SVN stood its ground, with most of the brave American boys already on the way home. But very surprisingly, in 1975, SVN quickly disappeared from the world, just like a shooting star at the end of its brilliant display. Two interesting questions occur: How, and Why?

It would take a long story to answer the two questions above. To make this long story short, I propose to sum it up in four main parts: first, how SVN came about; second, why SVN had to fight; third, how SVN fought out its war; and finally why and how SVN lost the war. The story tellers involved innumerable living testimonies from people who crossed my life. The majority of these tellers happened to be the so called “ralliers” (Hồi Chánh Viên). The experiences of many ralliers gained in North Vietnam before they infiltrated into South Vietnam often influenced their subsequent decision to rally to the anti-communist cause of the Saigon Government.

Under different circumstances, more than one hundred and forty thousand (or up to 194,000 according to some government document) of these former Communists abandoned their mission and rallied to the South Vietnamese Government and became free South Vietnamese. One of the strongest motivations for their change of heart was the realization that they had been lied to and deceived by the Communist leadership. Many of them chose to serve in their capacity to fight back against those who deceived them, on their own terms.

How Did I Gain Some Understanding Of The Communist Side?

My life experience brought me in contact with the “ralliers” and their life stories. As an electrical engineer working in the field of telecommunication from 1963 in Saigon, South Vietnam, my main duty was technical which was interesting enough. For additional income to support my young family, I did some odd jobs of translating books or documents from English to Vietnamese or vice versa for miscellaneous private groups or agencies or friends. Some of the translation works happened to contain interviews with former Communist “ralliers” that caught my attention and curiosity. This eventually led me to know both the interviewers and the interviewees, and finally I joined the club as a new friend with great interest in, and ability to learn and digest, new types of non-technical information. Before long, my ability of analysis and synthesis enabled me to write some articles regarding the Communist guerrillas, their warfare tactics, their organization, their strategy, the  source of their supplies, their manpower, their leadership in South Vietnam, and on their subordination to North Vietnam.

A great number of narratives from interviews of ralliers were also made available in my book with their names or aliases, including efforts to protect their personal safety. The format of interviewing involved audio recording and transcribing into written narrative. I was part of a loosely formed “club” of Vietnamese social science researchers, consisting of three or four friends who shared with each other the information obtained. While I was writing articles to be published in Tap San Cao Dang Quoc Phong (National Defense College Magazine), I was free to use the information and quotations from the pool of interviews. In that manner, I would not claim any exclusive right, nor would I divulge the names of other interviewers, for their personal safety. The original copies of these interviews and data related to the interviewees had been destroyed before the Communist took over Saigon in 1975.

Since a great numbers of the ralliers came from North Vietnam, their information helped reconstruct a picture of the immediate past, up to and including the Land Reform in 1953 and the period 1955-1956. Other information covered the material preparation by North Vietnam for conquest of the South. This included the building up of industrial complexes, airports, roads, the military training camps, the preparation of the so called “Ho Chi Minh trail” with roads system, storage centers on Laotian territory starting around 1958 through a series of steps up to and beyond 1968, to my limited knowledge. My writing contribution also included the period of the “Concerted Uprising” in 1959 (Dong Khoi 59), the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Mat Tran Dan Toc Giai Phong Mien Nam), or simply the NLF, in December 1960, and the guerrilla war leading to the intensification of the conflict in 1962-1963, both in military and political terms. Then came the Tonkin Gulf event leading to the American massive intervention, and the air war in North Vietnam and its effect on the North. Regarding the Southern front, my writings covered the main event of the Tet Offensive, and the 1972 Spring Summer Offensive leading to the Paris Agreement in early 1973, from the Vietnamese point of view.

All of the above writings were published by the War College Magazine of Saigon (Tap San Cao Dang Quoc Phong) under my pen name, Vo Truong Son. These articles were all based on interviews of the Communist ralliers. The intrinsic value of these articles lies in the raw information provided by the ralliers, not in the interpretation by the writer which may or may not be flawed. Some of the interviewed ralliers escaped to the U.S. in 1975. Many of them remained behind in Vietnam, and their fates are unknown. Once in the United States, I was able to retrieve copies of most of these articles from American libraries to serve my purpose of writing this book. And this book would tell the story the ralliers told me.

This book will also cover personal experience of acquaintances, friends and relatives which may be unique because of unique circumstances. All people involved in this book are real except, when indicated, their names would be an alias for their personal protection. Through this book the readers will learn about a history that might have been missing or mis-interpreted for lack of accurate data, or intentionally distorted by the enemy of Free Vietnam.

The Mosaic

The individual story of each case study represented only a small piece of a complex mosaic, and not a complete picture of what was going on in the Vietnam conflict in general. Each individual case study was enriched by that of so many people I happened to come across through different walks of life. As a native of North Vietnam, I was quite ignorant about the socio-economic condition in South Vietnam, together with the historic background that heavily influenced the complexity of the War. The complete mosaic including ralliers of South Vietnam origin, helped enhance my study.

The experience of many of my friends and acquaintances with communism as practiced by Ho and his Vietnam Worker’s Party (VWP, renamed Vietnam Communist Party after 1975) produced an intense aversion to Ho and the VWP. This anti-communist animus in turn help generate support for South Vietnam’s embattled government, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) that, for all its many defects and problems, led the country’s fight against imposition of the loathsome communist system on southern Vietnam. It is important, too, to place South Vietnam’s struggle in a global context. The US-RVN effort to contain communism at the 17th parallel dividing north and south Vietnam was part of a fifty-year long Cold War between Moscow, Beijing, Washington and other Western powers, all trying to nudge the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa along lines compatible with their own national interests and political philosophies.

The core argument of this book is that many, many Vietnamese were repelled by the cruelty and dishonesty of the VWP, rallied to the defense of individual freedom, rule of law and democratic self-government, and very probably would have been able to survive, with US support, if the United States had not abandoned the RVN in 1973-1975. Most of these Vietnamese who stood up to fight for South Vietnam were millions of unknown soldiers, simple farmers, young students, lower middle class merchants and so on… who put up with the war in a stoic manner. Only a small number of them are illustrated in this book as case studies that form the mosaic picture representing the socio-political aspects of the war.

Nguyen Thai Son, whom I begin to mention in Chapter 2, had been rather fortunate in his early life up to 1975. A native of a village in Nam Bo (Cochinchina) living in proximity to fighting between French and Viet Minh forces, Son’s early life was not peaceful at first. However, his parents owned immense farming lands at the center of the Mekong Delta, and since this area was soon occupied and pacified by the French, Son’s parents soon found opportunities for peaceful development and prosperity on the land. After 1975, Son found misfortune in Communist concentration camps for many years. Upon release, he managed to escape to the United States where I met and got to know him.

Bui Quang Triet (pen named Xuan Vu), another Southerner, native of Mo Cay District, Kien Hoa Province, Cochinchina, joined his uncle as a resistance fighter against the French in 1945. In 1954 he “regrouped” (tap ket) to go to North Vietnam as a writer, hoping to return to his land victorious in a general election that would reunite the nation under Ho in 1956. As it turned out, that general election never materialized. He felt betrayed by Ho’s promise and contacted the International Control Commission (ICC) with a petition to return to South Vietnam. He naively believed in the neutrality of the ICC, and failed in his objective because the latter reported his action to Ho’s government.

The above incident caused a small tempest in a tea cup. Bui Quang Triet was lucky to have survived Ho’s wrath. Gradually Bui Quang Triet (or Xuan Vu from now on) discovered the true nature of Communism and wisely learned to survive by adapting to the regime as a writer for the propaganda branch. He nevertheless did not abandon his dream of returning to South Vietnam, hopefully as a free man. When the opportunity came, he volunteered as a member of hundreds of thousands of infiltrators through the “Ho Chi Minh trail”, supposedly to free South Vietnam from American Imperialism. He finally reached his native village in one piece physically, but with a broken heart and devastated soul when he saw what the Communists did to his Southern land, his parents, grand parents, and all his loved ones. He was one of some 140,000 plus former communists to have rallied to the government of South Vietnam. I met him once or twice in 1973 or 1974 in Saigon, and was very impressed by his interesting character as well as his talent. I read one of his books, “Duong Di Khong Den” (Journey With No Arrival) in Saigon, and more books of his once I landed in the United States such as Den Ma Khong Den (Arrival But Not There Yet), Dong Bang Gai Goc (The Delta Full Of Challenges), Xuong Trang Truong Son (White Skelletons On Truong Son Range), Van Nghe Si Mien Bac Nhu Toi Biet (North Vietnamese Writers and Artists As I Knew), and Hai Ngan Ngay Tran Thu Cu Chi (Two Thousand Days In Defense Of Cu Chi), among other works of his, all printed in the United States. Xuan Vu finally was helped to escape to the United States before Saigon fell, fortunately. Now I could safely talk about him without fear of the Communists doing any harm to him — especially so after he passed away in 2004 in San Antonio, Texas.      

Another friend of mine, Dang My-Yung was not that lucky in her early age. Also an inhabitant of the Mekong Delta, her father, Mr. Dang Van Quang, was fighting the French and had his family in the Viet Minh controlled area, not far from the hostilities.

My-Yung’s father, Mr. Dang Van Quang was born in 1909 in Ba Cang, Vinh Long Province. He grew up as a teacher, then at 18, he joined the Viet Minh forces fighting against French colonialism. His political activities at some point brought him to jail, for two years. Upon release, he soon married a special girl from Can Tho Province.

From reading My-Yung’s memoir, it was amazing to see how much Mrs. Quang loved her husband for his patriotism. It was even more amazing to see the clarity of her political mind, how she hated Communism for its brutality and viciousness and for Ho’s commitment to an international ideology that resulted in the devastation of his own people. Because of her great love for and loyalty to her husband, she taught her children to love and be proud of their father and their country, but never to have anything to do with Communism. My-Yung grew up to share the same principle as her mother’s regarding the falsehood of the NLF and the Communist deception that succeeded in fooling a great many free people in both South Vietnam and the West.

To-Bach-Tuyet was another amazing Vietnamese lady from North Vietnam. I knew of her through my wife, and had been very impressed by her story as a Viet Minh sympathizer who decided to stay back in North Vietnam after the Partition in 1954 as a university student in Pharmacology. Through her experience with the Communist policies and actions, Bach Tuyet changed her mind and decided to escape from North Vietnam. Together with some companions, she made the journey by foot through the jungles from North Vietnam to Laos, reaching Vientiane, the capital of Laos, and got help from the South Vietnamese Embassy in Vientiane to finally resettle in South Vietnam. Eventually she completed her dream of being a Pharmacist, graduating from Saigon University. In 1975, when South Vietnam fell, she managed to get out and for a second time found herself a “fugitive from Ho Chi Minh’s paradise”, the place she once dreamed of before knowing what it really was. Bach Tuyet completed her journey by settling down and taking up studies in the United States to become a qualified Pharmacist again from an American University. She recently wrote her memoir of a student who braved hardships and dangers to escape Communism.

It’s a matter of great interest that I included an Australian acquaintance of mine in this book. Ted Serong, an Australian Brigadier General, had been in Vietnam in his capacity as advisor to the United States in the matter of Counter Insurgency War. Together with Sir Robert Thompson advising the GVN on the strategic hamlets program, Serong indirectly helped SVN in counter-guerrilla warfare as he gave input to the American Advisory Team on the training and organization of Vietnamese foot soldiers. Ted Serong was among the rare breed of experts on jungle warfare that most American top leaders were looking for at that time in the war. I was drawn to Serong not as a student in unconventional warfare, but through Australian friends affiliated with the National Civic Council, led by Bob Santamaria. In my capacity at that time as an electrical engineer, I knew very little about guerrilla warfare at first, while Serong had been a giant in that field. On the other hand, Serong might have been around 18 years my senior, and my acquaintance with him was extended for roughly nine years until April, 1975 when we parted, and never met again afterward — just to put things in good perspective.

Fundamental Issues

Basically, the Vietnam conflict was a struggle between the Non-Communist and Communist Vietnamese who followed very different objectives. The Non-Communist Vietnamese aimed at serving national independence and providing basic freedom to the people to choose their political system, and defending private ownership, the basic right of free speech and association. The Vietnamese Communists, on the other hand, followed a different ideology that served a dictatorship of the proletariat by a centralized repressive party state, suppressing civil society, denying freedom of speech, and denying private ownership to all citizens. In submitting to that international orientation, the Vietnamese Communists were fanatically committed to “Centralized Democracy” (Dan Chu Tap Trung), a jargon term used to mean the concentration of political power in the hands of a small group of people who claimed to be the “elites who know best” how to make people happy. Their “best” method of making people happy consisted of centralized planning of the economy in the hands of the elite group. The combination of the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small group of elites consequently led to the regimentation of the population into state controlled cooperatives in which private ownership no longer existed. The regimentation of the “human herds” under the absolute power in the hands of a few leaders naturally bred corruption, atrocities, and abuses that painfully affected the population. Thus, the objective of making the Vietnamese people “happy” was defeated. Under such a political system, the Vietnamese people had no way of changing it, although “freedom, democracy and happiness” were the three crucial elements in their constitution. Social justice was the justification for the “temporary” lack of basic goods and freedoms, in addition to the abundance of suffering.

Against the above approach to nation-building and governorship, the Non-Communist Vietnamese choice was a “democratic system of government” that would neither be “Communist Socialism” nor “Detroit Capitalism”. The essence of the Nationalist (non-communist) objective was to build a free enterprise system for the mass based on their limited capital resources plus their sense of family enterprise and individual ingenuity. There existed three main reasons for the above approach: first, the majority of the Vietnamese population in the South were small farmers who were best suited to family enterprise requiring very little capital funding; second, South Vietnam was deprived of most of the important mineral resources which were abundantly found in North Vietnam, such as coal, iron, manganese…; third, it would be unrealistic to emphasize the development of showy and impressive heavy industries at the cost of huge public debt by the nation and heavy taxes on the population for financing such an ambition.

  1. Social Justice And Class Warfare

The experience of land reform in north Vietnam had a deep impact on popular recognition of the violent and cruel nature of communist rule and what was likely to befall south Vietnam if the VWP ruled there. Experience of the VWP’s post-1954 land reform frequently figured prominently in the growing doubts about communism in the ralliers I interviewed. A general understanding of the DRV’s land reform is thus important.

North Vietnam, under Ho, started the nation down the road of Land Reform based on the Marxist dream of social justice while using class warfare as a fighting tool. The land reform was initiated in 1951 at Stalin’s urging with rules of the game set by Mao Zedong, while the execution of the land reform started in 1953 by Ho’s lieutenants trained by Chinese “specialists” in the arts of killing for the sake of social justice.

Marxist class warfare’s fighting tools consisted of playing on greed and jealousy to whip up hatreds and violences among the poor against the rich. The rule of the game was the setting up of kangaroo courts, in which the landless farmers would carry the instruments of justice in condemning and indicting the “guilty” parties, supposedly the rich landlords. The reward in the game was a promise of redistribution of lands and goods taken from the supposedly “guilty” rich farmers and given to the landless farmers. The game played out effectively. Not only were rich landlords killed, but also not-so-rich farmers and “collateral victims” including Ho’s political enemies such as catholic priests, intellectuals who disagreed with Ho, and even Communist party members who potentially could become Ho’s enemies. Ho strictly followed Lenin’s and Stalin’s rule: he’d rather kill ten innocents by mistake than miss one enemy through negligence.

Many superficial books have been written about the Land Reform, and most writers academically treated it as a “social reform” with statistics about the amount of land redistributed. Interviews of many Communist ralliers revealed a number of crucial but missing facts:

First, the Land Reform was not a “social reform”, but a political campaign of terror to eliminate Ho’s real and perceived potential enemies prior to the establishment of Ho’s dictatorship.

Second, the redistribution of land to the landless was just temporary bait and did not last. Eventually, all the lands including bodies of water and farming instruments were nationalized and every farmer became empty handed. Every able farmer ended up enslaved in collectivized State Farms or Cooperatives (Nong Truong Tap The and Hop Tac Xa).

Third, the Land Reform set the precedent for the so called “Reform in Industry-Commerce-Private-Capitalist-Enterprise” (Cai Tao Cong Thuong Nghiep Tu Ban Tu Doanh). This reform ended up with collectivized industrial complexes (Cong Truong Quoc Doanh) and the State Owned Commerce Cooperative (Hop Tac Xa Thuong Nghiep Quoc Doanh). This was the true nature of a centralized economy.

Fourth, and most important of all, Ho’s land reform ended with his total control of manpower and national resources dedicated to the task of eventually conquering South Vietnam. Ho explained this task as an “International Duty” and a commitment for every North Vietnamese.

Ho’s decision to conquer South Vietnam was a defining factor that complicated the task of nation-building carried out by the South Vietnamese who had no other choice than to seek American assistance and to depend on a long term alliance with the West — wisely or unwisely. But surrendering to Ho without a fight had never been an option for South Vietnam in the first place.

Above is a short summary of the fundamental differences between the Nationalist (non-communist) and Communist Vietnamese as the cause of the conflict.

Why did South Vietnam have to fight? There were two main reasons:

First: Ho’s “land reform” exposed the pathological nature of the communist system as inherently destructive and viciously murderous, and basically against human nature. To resist, oppose, and fight against Ho and the Vietnamese communists would not be just a matter of opinion, but a matter of principle, a matter of life and death for the survival of Vietnam, as a people and a culture.

Second: Even if South Vietnamese wished to be left alone in peace, Ho would not allow this to happen. Ho’s physical preparation in terms of logistics, armament, the regimentation of manpower, political emulation, and inroad infiltration of forward agents into South Vietnam, represented a resolute decision for war, for domination, and for subjugation. South Vietnam had been left with no other choice than to fight back, with American backup.

But Why Did South Vietnam Lose The War?

 

After 1975, many writers voiced different theories, or conclusions, regarding the ending of the conflict. Some considered that final chapter of the war as a convenient ending for an un-necessary conflict which could have been avoided, after all. Others found convenient ways to congratulate the winners in North Vietnam, and defamatory indictments to justify the unfortunate sufferings fallen upon South Vietnamese, the defeated. In these writers’ view, South Vietnam’s defeat was unavoidable, as a result of division, corruption in the political leadership and the army, the inability of the soldiers to fight, and the lack of willingness by the people to stand up and support the government.

This version of opinion against South Vietnam was so widespread and noisy to the point of drowning and suffocating the scattered voices and opinions of a third party that happened to have thought otherwise. It took forty years for the Vietnam Syndrome to wane and for a number of writers (mostly Americans) to begin to take a revised view of different aspects of the war. These writers based their research on newly declassified data of the period under consideration.

On the other hand, from the point of view of a Vietnamese who had lived with the war, seeing how the war was progressing, I had a great advantage in having contact with former Communist ralliers, obtaining rare information on the way the Communists operated in South Vietnam and North Vietnam. I had a privileged view in understanding how and why the People’s War in the South arose in the period 1960-1965, how it stalled in the period 1965-1967, and how it declined disastrously after the Tet Offensive.  

 

According to some unverified quotations by some ralliers, Mao Zedong used to boast that his brand of People’s War would be invincible, unless the enemy discovered the secret for this invincibility. After the Tet Offensive, Mao’s People’s War in South Vietnam suffered a deadly decline because the secret of the People’s War had been deciphered based on information given out by the Communist ralliers. Following the decline of People’s War in South Vietnam since the Tet Offensive in1968, it was clear that North Vietnam had second thoughts in Summer 1972, by launching the massive conventional campaign across the DMZ, using hundreds of tanks and heavy artillery and several divisions of regular armed forces. Again, North Vietnam was defeated, even with most Americans fighting boys out of Vietnam.

The discovery of the People’s War secret had been found independently by Vietnamese and American counterparts in different theaters of operations. On the other hand, the application of the antidote to cure the People’s War disease had been a joint effort. It benefited South Vietnam in her efforts to eradicate the Communist infrastructure in South Vietnam, to recover her strength, and gradually enabled her to stand on her feet with self-confidence (how effectively is a matter of debate). But clearly, South Vietnam could push back the Communists and stand her ground given sufficient arms, ammunitions, and logistics. That was the picture starting from 1968 up to 1973, as South Vietnam regained her confidence and energy to stand up and fight.

The reality described above had been the crux of the matter that many prolific writers ignored, or un-intentionally missed, partly because the American main stream media lost interest, and partly because of the anti-war public opinion and pressure on Congress to put emphasis on a vision of disengagement from Vietnam. On the other hand, with Nixon visiting Mao Zedong, followed by the Shanghai Communique in 1972, South Vietnam was no longer a foremost outpost of anti-communism, in general parlance. South Vietnam would be expendable. As capable observers could well see, the Vietnam – U.S. “partnership was based on the fear of a common enemy” 1 in the 50’s and 60’s; the same partnership crumbled in the 70’s because that common enemy had become a shotgun partner in the Sino-U.S. partnership.

As an expendable ally, South Vietnam became a nuisance to the big brother when Hanoi launched the massive invasion supported by Russian tanks and Chinese heavy weapons in 1975 — a nuisance because South Vietnam depended entirely on the United States for arms and fuel, while the latter no longer considered the former a vital interest. To get rid of the nuisance, big brother just cut off aid.

Why This Book

My life had been un-eventful. There had been nothing dramatic. I grew up as a young man, then a professional. I had been mobilized and trained as a soldier to fight in the war. In view of shortages in technologists and engineers in the civilian public service, I had been one of several hundreds of South Vietnamese assigned to remain in the parent organizations, whether civilian or professional. As it turned out, I had never been in an active role in combat or seen flying bullets, exploding rockets and mines. My family and I had been protected by countless young men who braved dangers and death daily. I finally got out of Vietnam safely when the country fell. I was very fortunate indeed. But I lost my country, and could never forget the fact that hundreds of thousands of young and old men fell for the safety and freedom of ordinary people like me and my family. We owed our freedom and good life to those thousands of known and unknown soldiers, both Vietnamese and American, who died bravely and selflessly. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese soldiers, administrative and political cadres, survived the war only to be put in concentration camps as victims of the policy of revenge by the victors. Hundreds of thousands of Americans shared our dream of Freedom and Democracy, who tried hard to help, only to end up sharing our failure. I want to thank them from the bottom of my heart. I am in great debt to those ralliers, thanks to whom I learned a great deal about the other side of the war. Thousands of them, unable to escape Vietnam at the last minute, might well have fallen victims of the same revenge policy, under even harsher hatreds and tortures.

Why “The Rest of the Story”

Most important of all, I wrote this book largely based on primary sources of information, from the Vietnamese side of the war. This was not a book written by an American who addressed the narrative of the Vietnam War as a part of American history in foreign relations. The major part of this story, not written by any Western writers, was provided by North Vietnamese being sent to “liberate” South Vietnam. This was the story of South Vietnamese who stood up against a foreign ideology, fought and died with the help of a Super Power, then were betrayed and abandoned as an inconvenience, and ended up suffering, writhing under the cruel grip of the victors. This book presents a complementary view of the war, not known or seen by most scholars or observers across the Pacific who made their study through a telescope, accurate though it may be, but one-sided, and regrettably lacking in depth,. This book by no means ignores foreign data, including declassified facts and information, which are vitally important to the talking points. That’s why this is “the Rest of the Story” of the 1945-1975 Upheaval. Welcome to “A Shooting Star.

                                               

Reference

1.” Diem’s Final Failure”, Philips E. Catton, University Press of Kansas, p. 5

 

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